By Tsering Topgyal
Every state in Asia and beyond is hedging against the rise of China. Unsure of Chinese intentions, even America has adopted the hedging strategy of “congagement”—containing and engaging China at once. Yet, hedging cannot go on forever; at some point, every one will have to decide whether its interest lies in befriending or undermining China. In international relations parlance, they will have to decide whether to band-wagon or balance against China. The Tibetans have also been hedging against China since the mid-1980s: courting international allies while seeking negotiations with Beijing. With some qualifications, it is true that the supporters and detractors of the Middle Way Path (MWP) are pulling the Tibet movement in the directions of band-wagoning and balancing, respectively. The movement as a whole has not yet chosen one or the other strategy. One day, Tibetans too will have to decide which strategy best meets the strategic objective of national survival. It is important to understand what each of these strategies mean and entail for the Tibetans.
From the menu of strategies available for states and nations—isolationism, hegemony, balancing and band-wagoning—the last two are relevant to the Tibetans today. Balancing and band-wagoning are strategies for confronting threats posed by rising and stronger states. Under a balancing strategy, the threatened party augments its power to neutralize the threat; internal armament and alliance formation are the primary means of increasing one’s power. Alternatively, because other strategies are unrealistic and/or the weaker party sees economic, political and security gains, it chooses to curry favour with a stronger power. The balancing and band-wagoning features of the Tibetan struggle differ in form, but the underlying motivations and principles remain the same as conventionally understood in international relations.
In the Tibetan struggle, the balancing aspect is represented by (1) the lobbying of American, Canadian, European and Indian governments to pressure China; (2) mobilization of private citizens to pressure their governments to do (1) and directly protest Chinese policies; and (3) cooperating with international organizations to name and shame China on rights failures. The Tibet Support Groups, coordinated by the ITSN, are the core alliance partners. ITSN is analogous to NATO. These ties are normative/moral alliances in contradistinction to conventional military alliances. To the extent that morality, norms and ideas shape international politics, these alliances do serve some purposes. However, if US-China relations deteriorate beyond repair in the future, it is plausible that the US might resuscitate the pre-1970 covert-military alliance. Being the modern home of realism, if overall national interests dictate it, America will not rule anything out. The question is whether or not a cohesive and potent Tibetan community remains to reciprocate the American advances. Indeed, whether or not the Tibetans will be astute enough to play America off against China, rather than be exploited for American interests again, is the key question.
On the other hand, when the Dalai Lama and TGIE insist that they are not seeking independence, only “genuine autonomy within the framework of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” because “land-locked” Tibet will benefit from association with China, it is hard to miss the band-wagoning language. Not only is it the best guarantee for the survival of the Tibetan nation, they reason, there are tangible material benefits too. With the growing popularity of Tibetan Buddhism among ordinary Chinese and creeping penetration into the party and government hierarchy, a future ‘patron-priest’ security arrangement may not entirely be out of their minds.
There are benefits and risks associated with both strategies, though. Since the benefits should have been obvious to the Tibetans who espouse one or the other strategy, it is prudent to point out the associated risks here.
For a state, a balancing strategy carries economic costs associated with maintaining a strong military at home and diplomatic presence abroad, and non-economic costs of having to adjust one’s policies to suit existing and prospective partners (less strategic choice). The frequent statement that if “we” abandon non-violence, the Tibetan struggle will lose its unique quality and the “overwhelming” support that it attracts from the international community will be undermined, is an illustration of strategic constraints inherent in any alliance. Further, balancing takes place in an environment of uncertainty of desire, intentions and fickleness of behaviour—a constant feature of international politics. First and foremost, the opponents of MWP should address the question: do Tibetans have the capabilities to pursue a balancing strategy against a rising China? There are three ingredients for designing strategies: goals, means and inter-dependent choice. Inter-dependent choice requires that (1) goals and means should be calibrated and (2) the strategy should adjust to the capabilities and expected response of the adversary. Under the current reality, such an analysis is depressing. Apart from the economic costs of maintaining lobbying agents, which may be bearable, the Tibetans are constrained by the interests of supportive states, organizational interests and the positions of individual supporters. Tibetans have experienced first-hand the fickleness of international support, governmental as well as private. Equally crucially, the critics of MWP should ponder the constant availability of alliance partners. Often, material interests trump moral principles. Even moral and normative entrepreneurs get exhaustion. Finally, a balancing strategy always runs the risk of provoking the target to respond in kind or worse. The Tibetans should ruminate long and hard on this point.
Band-wagoning is equally risky. The most obvious pit-fall is miscalculating the benign intentions of a stronger power. Stalin’s strategy of allying with Nazi Germany illustrates best the merits and risks of band-wagoning. Initially, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact reaped the benefit of partitioning Poland and the Baltic states, but subsequently, incurred the cost of German invasion of the Soviet Union itself. The interests of even sincerely benign states evolve to the detriment of the band-wagoning party. Suspicion of Chinese motives based on history abounds in the Tibetan mind. The proponents of MWP must ponder the possibility that the Chinese may not honour an agreement after gaining the Dalai Lama’s return and his signature conferring legitimacy to Chinese sovereignty. Credible security guarantees—third party guarantees or irreversible power-sharing arrangements, for instance—obviate the danger of entrapment. Further, even if the leadership in Beijing at the time of settlement is sincerely interested in a solution, what if a new leadership with anti-Tibetan inclinations rises in China? What if China takes an ultra-nationalist turn or goes through another revolution with negative consequences for Tibet? Uncertainty about the intentions and capabilities of other states is a constant dilemma in international politics. The Tibetan leadership faces a similar predicament.
The proponents of MWP speak as if the threats facing the Tibetan nation will vanish after “genuine autonomy” is granted. The conflictual nature of Sino-Tibetans will cease once a “mutually beneficial” agreement is negotiated. They have not articulated a vision of Tibetan national purpose after autonomy is achieved. Chinese nationalism and insecurity will ensure that even after autonomy is negotiated, Beijing will not pass any opportunity to undermine Lhasa’s autonomy. MWP strategists will have to address the dangers inherent in a band-wagoning strategy.
It is unreasonable to expect and strategically unwise for the Dalai Lama and TGIE to openly express their opinions, but the Tibetans as a nation should ponder some questions. If and when China democratizes, it is plausible that the Tibetans too will have more political space. Should an autonomous Tibet use the democratic space to fight for even greater autonomy? If and when China gets embroiled in life-and-death confrontations with other great powers, the Tibetans—if they manage to survive as cohesive community, that is—will have suitors for covert or overt partnerships. Should the Tibetans take advantage of these windows of opportunities? Or should they remain satisfied with the autonomous status that the MWP stands for? These post-settlement scenarios have to be analyzed in light of the certainty that the conflictual nature of the Sino-Tibetan relations will persist indefinitely. Needless to say, how Beijing actually behaves vis-à-vis Tibet should, and will, be a significant determinant in analysis and practice.
The writer is a student at London School of Economics and Political Science.
This essay appears in the Tibet Society Briefing, Spring 2006.
