A recent report written by the US-based Tibetan researchers Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho attempts to provide an assessment of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue process. In the report, the authors argue that the two sides are unlikely to overcome their differences on substantive issues, thus leaving the chances for a negotiated solution of the Tibet issue still limited. However, they also maintain that “in many ways, prospects for Sino-Tibetan engagement are better now than they have ever been”, since the current dialogue process provides Beijing “a risk management strategy for the region while presenting exiled Tibetan leaders a new opportunity to play a role in the deliberations over issues facing contemporary Tibet”. Whether this opportunity will be used to push for “conditions more conducive to a negotiated settlement remains to be seen”.
The first part of the report analyses the history of Sino-Tibetan contacts since Deng Xiaoping’s “historic gesture toward reconciliation” in 1979 and questions the view that important opportunities for negotiations were missed in the 1980s.
According to Rabgey and Sharlho, Deng’s strategy was based on a drastic miscalculation of Tibetans’ acceptance of Chinese rule in Tibet. The overwhelming nationalist sentiments which became apparent during the visit to Tibet of the Dalai Lama’s fact-finding missions forced Beijing to reassess its strategy toward Tibet and the Dalai Lama, thus closing the door to dialogue in 1984. Beijing initiated a second attempt at dialogue in 1988 due to “the Dalai Lama’s success in raising the profile of Tibet in international forums”, which appeared to be characterised by more openness. However, the internal political upheavals culminating in Tiananmen in June 1989 again cut short the move.
The 1990s were characterised by China pursuing a hard-line policy in Tibet and by the Tibetan leadership’s “uneven commitment to engagement”. The quiet re-establishment of direct channels in 1997, though publicly acknowledged by Jiang Zemin, were, so the authors claim, “derailed by institutional resistance”, and it is only after the flight of Agya Rinpoche in 1998 and the Karmapa in 2000, that the policy of excluding the Dalai Lama was “formally overturned at the Fourth Work Forum on Tibet”.
The authors argue that the “current experimentation” with direct contacts “remains tentative”, characterised by the “public ambivalence” of the Chinese authorities who decline to acknowledge that discussions are even taking place. The authors reckon that the willingness of Chinese scholars and strategic analysts, “to criticise the prevailing hard-line policies suggests that the move toward talks is motivated not just by short run political goals but also by a reasoned and sober consideration of China’s long-term interests”. Contrary to expectations, the current Western Development Drive has given rise to a heightened sense of ethnic cleavage and dispossession among Tibetans in Tibet, and this could, the authors suggest, reinforce growing concerns within China about Beijing’s current Tibet policy.
They see as “one of the most striking developments” an institutional restructuring of “Beijing’s decision-making process” for managing the Tibet issue, visible in the creation of a ‘leading small group’ on Tibet, the drastic expansion of the Tibetan units in the United Front (the Party organ managing and dealing with ethnic, religious and other social groups outside the Communist Party), and the overhauling of the key personnel dealing with Tibetan policy and administration.
The authors’ view is that these developments “have made Beijing’s institutional management of Tibetan affairs more complex and considerably less predictable”.
The authors see China’s legitimacy problem in Tibet and a push towards autonomy and local rule as “likely to intensify”, while “the window of opportunity to negotiate a lasting solution draws to a close”. Under these “unpromising circumstances”, the challenge for the exile Tibetans around the Dalai Lama will be to “determine whether it makes sense for Tibetans to bargain seriously with Beijing instead of preparing for a better day to strike a deal”.
Rabgey and Sharlho’s report was published by the East-West Center, Washington DC, in their series ‘Dynamics and Management of Internal Conflicts in Asia’, and is entitled ‘Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects’.
Click here to read the full version of the report in PDF format.
